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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis reviews some of the main arguments of the right or not to pornography in order to 
defend that censoring pornography would bring many negative consequences for women and 
minorities. The thesis will argue that a ban on pornography would make women and minorities 
more exposed to exploitation, would ignore other forms of hatred towards women in media, would 
threaten women's autonomy over their bodies, and would neglect the possibility of educating 
towards consensual values through pornography.  
Moreover, this thesis also advances that promoting female participation in the production of 
pornography and ensuring minimal working conditions for sex works could avoid many of the 
exploitation there is in mainstream pornography.   
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Preface 
This thesis came into being as a consequence of my interest for gender equality and women’s rights. 
As a feminist, pornography and women’s liberation are things which go hand in hand. 
This year, I have attended the festival InQueerSections, one of the biggest inspirations for this thesis 
topic. There, I have met sex workers, feminists and activists and it was there where my interest in 
pornography started to grow and I became invested in writing about women and the consequences 
of censoring pornography.   
Throughout the process of writing, I have faced many challenges. I was still getting used to living in 
a new country, which I now love, and sometimes I was afraid I would not be able to finish this 
thesis successfully. During the months of writing, many people who asked me what was I writing 
about seemed not to understand the importance of debating pornography and gender equality 
together; perhaps for many of them it was not relevant. However, the more I read for this thesis, and 
the more people asked me about my thesis topic, I became more and more aware of the importance 
to write about women and pornography. 
I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Vrousalis, for providing me feedback on my drafts, 
and for helping me in shaping my ideas an arguments. Also, I am thankful to my parents, Maria 
José and Nelson, for being very supportive. I am deeply thankful to my partner, Nick Adriaans, who 
heard my ideas many times and helped me through the most difficult times of writing. He provided 
insightful and useful comments to my drafts and has supported me unconditionally. Finally, I would 
like to thank my friend Katrine Smiet, for always being there for me when I needed feedback and 
good criticism.  
 
Kind regards, 
Jessica Lima 
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1. Introduction 
In private, the women still sexually service the male, for whose pleasure they are called into existence. 
The pleasure of the male requires the annihilation of women's sexual integrity. There is no privacy, no 
closed door, no self-determined meaning, for women with each other in the world of pornography. 
(Dworkin, 1989, p. 47) 
For many, sexual equality is inhibited by the production, distribution and consumption of 
pornography. Radical feminists have held this position, arguing that pornography poses a serious 
challenge to equality. Simultaneously, many other scholars have attempted to deconstruct this 
reasoning, demonstrating that pornography needs not pose an obstacle for gender equality.  
In this master thesis I propose to address the debate of the right or not to pornography. Through an 
analysis of the most prominent scholars who have approached pornography and gender equality 
together, I will provide an answer to the question: Is the censorship of pornography good for gender 
equality? 
Radical feminists have made a strong case against pornography arguing that it creates and 
perpetuates gender inequalities. In the words of Mackinnon (1986), ''A critique of pornography is to 
feminism what its defense is to male supremacy'' (p. 63). Others, such as Andrea Dworkin, argue 
that pornography is no less than the depiction of male power, of the dominance of the man over the 
woman, the submission and humiliation of the latter (1989). The feminist argument entails the 
assumption that pornography silences women, as Hornsby and Langton argue (1998), and should 
therefore be restricted or even banned. Because pornography as depiction of male power silences 
women, the feminists defend that pornography itself should be censored. 
Ronald Dworkin, a liberal scholar, has fought against the idea of the censorship to pornography, 
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since the silencing of women does not offer them the right to silence other practices because they 
feel offended by them (Dworkin, 1981). Only the harm principle, then, could justify to liberals the 
censorship of pornography. This principle holds that ‘‘(…) the only good reason to restrict speech 
(or conduct) is to prevent harm to vital social institutions or nonconsenting third parties'' (Scoccia, 
1996, p. 779). 
However, other feminists have also questioned the radical feminist notion that pornography was at 
the center of women's inequality; many of these debates arose during the so-called Sex Wars in the 
80's
1
, which reflected divisions among the feminists concerning divergent opinions about 
pornography and female sexuality (Abrams, 1995).  
For the purpose of this thesis, I will think of pornography as potentially harmful, taking mainly into 
account the contributions of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon, but I will argue, contra 
these authors, that censoring pornography would not contribute positively to gender equality. The 
two authors were involved in the drawing of the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances, which 
advocated for a strict regulation of pornography in the two cities, given the harms that pornography 
would inflict on women and minorities. Despite their efforts, the courts have ruled the ordinances 
unconstitutional, believing that such ordinances would threat freedom of speech, value which is 
protected under the First Amendment of the United States. 
As we shall see, the feminists consider that pornography conflicts with equality, because the 
depictions in pornography convey a wrong message about women. Pornography, according to this 
view, humiliates women on screen and validates the violent treatment of women.  
                                                 
1 See Duggan (1993): ''In the mid-1980's, an acrimonious split developed in the feminist movement after anti-
pornography feminists began drafting and campaigning for legislation directed at regulating pornographic 
expression'' (p.25). 
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It is hard to assess whether there is a direct link between pornography and violence towards women, 
and this thesis will take for granted the assumption that much of the misogyny and sexism that 
women face nowadays is perpetrated by mainstream pornography. However, this thesis will argue 
that the censorship of pornography is not a desirable mean of achieving gender equality, because it 
entails many risks for women and minorities in the industry. Thus, this thesis will also argue, that 
more ethical pornography could provide better alternatives to mainstream pornography, if women 
and other minorities are implicated in pornography production, and if pornography is understood as 
a form of sex work. It will be also advanced that this could bring many possibilities for women and 
minorities, who could use pornography as a means of sexual education, fighting against the 
narratives of mainstream pornography.  
Thus, to answer the research question, I propose the following organization: first, I will define 
pornography, with the help of radical feminist scholars and others who have presented objections to 
the radical conception (chapter 2); After that, I will review some of the literature concerning the 
radical feminist argument of the silencing of women and some of Ronald Dworkin's objections; In 
the same chapter, I will review the Ordinance attempts at regulating pornography (chapter 3); 
Subsequently, I will present my argument: that the censorship of pornography does not solve our 
concerns with gender inequalities, because it would involve many negative consequences for those 
who are most affected by the dangers of the pornographic industry; Here, I will briefly introduce 
and discuss two alternatives to the censorship of pornography: more female-made pornography and 
more working conditions for sex workers (chapter 4): Finally, I conclude that the censorship of 
pornography would affect women and minorities negatively (chapter 5).  
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2. Conceptualization: What is Pornography? 
As we shall see, defining pornography is not an easy task. The purposes of this chapter will be to 
analyze the conceptions of pornography that the radical feminists and other scholars have 
attempted, in order to understand why the debate around censoring pornography is still much alive. 
Next to that, this section will address the criticisms that have been pointed out to the feminist 
definitions, to propose that they present serious challenges to the goal of gender equality. 
In the work Pornography and Civil Rights – A New Day for Women's Equality (1989), Andrea 
Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon provide the definition of pornography which they have 
delineated in the Minneapolis ordinance. They define pornography as: 
...the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words that also 
includes one or more of the following: (i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, 
or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) 
women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women 
are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) 
women are presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (vi) 
women's body parts – including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or butlocks – are exhibited such 
that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or (viii) 
women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios 
of degradation, injure, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that 
makes those conditions sexual (p. 36). 
This passage presents a very detailed definition of pornography. Here, pornography is 
conceptualized as sexual violence towards women, in a context which intent is to provide sexual 
arousal to its audience precisely by humiliating women physically hurting them. In another work, 
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Andrea Dworkin (1989) goes on a more literary style, and refers to pornography in the following 
manner: ''Pornography reveals that male pleasure is inextricably tied to victimizing, hurting and 
exploiting; that sexual fun and sexual passion in the privacy of the male imagination are inseparable 
from the brutality of male history'' (p. 69). 
Based on these definitions, pornography is conceptualized as very damaging to women, because it 
is a reflection of male power within society. For Dworkin, the women in pornography are ''whores''. 
The author states that the literal meaning of pornography derives from the ancient Greek ''writing 
about whores'' (p. 199), to argue that ''whores'' exist only in the context of male domination in 
society. Thus, according to Dworkin, men created ''whores'' (1989). For her, women are whores at 
the same time that women are not persons (Dworkin, 1989); women are objects which are at the 
disposition of male's pleasure.  
In another work, MacKinnon argues:  
Pornography is a means through which sexuality is socially constructed, a site of construction, a 
domain of exercise. It constructs women as things for sexual use and constructs its consumers to 
desperately want women to desperately want possession and cruelty and dehumanization. Inequality  
itself, subjection itself, hierarchy itself, objectification itself, with self-determination ecstatically 
relinquished, is the apparent content of women's sexual desire and desirability (1989, p. 327). 
Here, MacKinnon asserts that pornography defines women by determining that women's desires 
relate to their humiliation; pornography says what women are and defines what women want:  
women want to be submissive and humiliated, objectified, and powerless towards men.  
Vadas (2005) provides another definition of pornography, also placing objectification as a central 
concept in pornographic depictions. Pornography, in her words, is: 
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Any object that has been manufactured to satisfy sexual desire through its sexual consumption or other 
sexual use as a woman or child, or as a man, or transsexual, or as part or parts of combination of these, 
or variations of these. (p. 177) 
Again, according to Vadas, women that are in pornography are not persons; women are 
manufactured into objects, not because that creation is the end of pornography itself, but because 
they are manufactured to produce pleasure in the male audience; that pleasure is theirs to provide.  
At best, the previous conceptualizations declare that pornography involves a certain degree of 
violence towards women; at worst, they implicate that pornography is necessarily in itself hatred 
towards women. Nonetheless, the radical feminists conceive that depictions of arousal – not 
necessarily sexually explicit - need not need to involve violence, under the conceptualization of 
erotica. This idea will be matured in some paragraphs below. 
Vadas (1987) categorizes Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon's definition of pornography 
as the civil rights view, in which, if pornography is the subordination of women, then it would 
follow that pornography subordinates women. The author differentiates their conceptualization 
from what she considers to be the reasonable view, which says that ''Pornography is sexually 
explicit material – pictures on paper or film, or words on a page'' (p. 490). For Vadas, the normative 
implications of the reasonable view will be different from the Dworkin/MacKinnon's (1987): 
although the reasonable definition may suggest that pornography involves violence towards women, 
it does not imply that the depiction of sexual images subordinates women (1987).  
However, the reasonable view does not capture what pornography is, since not all sexually explicit 
material could count as pornographic (Rea, 2001). As the author argues, hardly one could classify 
Michelangelo's David as pornographic, and the same could be said about the Bible (2001). Rea 
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identifies six major categories of common pornography definitions
2
, one of which Dworkin and 
MacKinnon fall into: definitions which define pornography as in relation to oppression (2001). 
According to Rea, in the feminist definition, something only is pornographic if someone is being 
subordinated (2001); second, Rea continues, ''one might well doubt whether it is even possible for a 
mere depiction to subordinate someone'' (2001, p. 130). The author argues: according to Dworkin 
and MacKinnon, it is not clear whether a woman showing her genitals in a pornographic magazine 
would count as pornography, because it is not clear whether a woman is being subordinated or not. 
Thus, someone being subordinated is a necessary condition for something to be pornographic 
(2001). 
Perhaps the distinction between pornography and erotica could provide an answer to Rea's doubt; 
under the concept of erotica one could place sexually explicit materials which would not 
subordinate women; the question then is, how sexually explicit material subordinates women, and 
why does erotica not subordinate women in contrast to pornography. In the words of Andrea 
Dworkin;  
Feminists have made honorable efforts to define the difference, [between pornography and erotica] in 
general asserting that erotica involves mutuality and reciprocity, whereas pornography involves 
dominance and violence. But in the male sexual lexicon, which is the vocabulary of power, erotica is 
simply high-class pornography: better produced, better conceived, better executed, better packaged, 
designed for a better class of consumer (1989, p. 9-10). 
It is unclear where to allocate materials which would be considered pornographic, but which would 
not be considered erotica either: Sadomasochist practices, for example, might involve consent from 
                                                 
2 See Rea (2001): - ''sex-for-profit'' definitions, ''bad art'' definitions, ''as/as-only/only-as'' definitions, 'obscenity'' 
definitions, ''oppression'' definitions and intention/effect definitions. 
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both partners, but might also be violent: imagine that a woman would be dominating the man, for 
instance, and both would be fully consenting of such activity. Perhaps it might involve reciprocity 
and mutuality, but because it is violent, it would be considered pornographic.  
In this thesis, I will use the concept of pornography to describe sexually explicit images, in the 
sense that Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon did. 
The implications of the radical feminist view on pornography are not only normative, but empirical 
as well, so they argue. As Dworkin demonstrates (1989), pornography is a depiction of the societal 
sexual inequalities, but it also creates inequality because it validates women's submission through 
images and words. As we have seen, pornography shows that women like to be physically hurt, and 
further legitimizes violence and hatred towards women.  
However, it has also been argued that the definition which the radical feminists provide somehow 
constitutes a closed definition of sexuality and women's desires. For them, sadomasochist practices 
would be considered humiliating, and they are also proximate to traditional and conservative views 
on sex, which can be stigmatizing for sexual minorities and other sexual practices (Ferguson, 1984).   
Wolfson (1994) argues that defining pornography always depends on some subjective judgment: 
''Pornography is a concept that cannot be defined without taking a particular ideological, religious 
or moral position on fundamental views of life. Any attempted definition of pornography contains a 
philosophical viewpoint of what compromises an ethically acceptable society'' (p. 1041). Further on, 
he asserts: ''The dispute over the definition of pornography involves the deepest view possible about 
the nature of the good (or evil) of society'' (1994, p. 1042).  
Moreover, views on sexuality, among other divisions, separated radical feminists and libertarian 
feminists (1984) during The Sex Wars. A libertarian feminist would disagree with Dworkin and 
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MacKinnon on their view about pornography, because libertarians would place a much more 
(positive) emphasis on the concepts of consensuality and pleasure, trusting a woman's capacity to 
freely make choices (1984). The radicals, on the other hand, wonder if a woman could ever decide 
freely from socioeconomic constraints: because women are at a more disadvantage position 
compared to men, several of them, coming from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, do not have 
many options available but to choose to work in the sex industry (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989). 
Thus, they question whether the participation of women in pornography is really a free choice.  
At this point, although it is hard to find a definite definition of pornography, we should have an idea 
of what pornography constitutes. In this chapter, I have presented some of the radical feminist 
notions of pornography, and I have also presented objections posed to MacKinnon's and Dworkin's 
definition of pornography. In the following chapter will review some of the most relevant literature 
concerning the censorship of pornography; Furthermore, the next chapter will also analyze one the 
legal attempts at regulating pornography designed by Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon. 
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3. Literature review 
3.1. Introduction 
The preceding section presented one of the central concepts of this thesis. In this chapter, I will 
review one of the arguments in favor of the censorship of pornography, which has been developed 
by the radical feminists, and would implicate the censorship of pornography on the basis of 
pornography colliding with the free speech of women. I will also present some of the objections 
presented by Ronald Dworkin against the censorship of pornography. Finally, I will present Andrea 
Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon's attempts for the regulation of production, distribution, and 
consumption of pornography. 
 
3.2. The Silencing Argument Against Pornography 
As we saw on the preceding chapter, pornography seems to hurt women by humiliating them on 
screen. Pornography, then, appears to be a violent act against women.  
Hence, as we shall see, efforts to regulate pornography first derive from the premise that 
pornography hurts women. This section will advance that the dangers of pornography are more 
complex than a depiction of violence on screen. If we consider the definitions provided in the last 
chapter, it is reasonable to argue that pornography, by depicting violence towards women, not only 
hurts them on screen, but legitimizes further violence ''in real life''. In this section, I will review 
some of the most prominent feminist ideas against pornography, which explains to what extent 
pornography hurts women and minorities.  
Dworkin and MacKinnon have battled for the censorship of pornography as a form of gender 
discrimination; according to the authors, pornography creates sexual inequalities because it depicts 
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and legitimizes women's submission to men. Dworkin (1989) argues that pornography is a 
demonstration of the male power in society, which she calls ''male supremacy''. Pornography 
provides to men the idea that the existence of women is for the male's own pleasure; men's pleasure, 
pornography demonstrates, can only exist when women are submissive to men. Thus, according to 
Dworkin, pornography teaches that men's sexual pleasure entails the objectification of women; 
those are the ''whores'' that men create through pornography. For the author, ''whores'' only exist in 
the context of male domination. 
On the one hand, Dworkin (1989) argues that pornography demonstrates that humiliating and 
beating women is acceptable; one the other hand, because these actions are shown to be admissible, 
it reinforces the power of men over women. More broadly, pornography provides men an idea of 
what sex is and what its purpose is: pornography's purpose it to show that sexual relations are about 
male pleasure, which is achieved by humiliating women and coercing them to sex. In this sense, 
pornography affects how society (men, but also women), see sex: sex between a man and a woman 
implicates that the needs of the latter are inexistent, because her only purpose is to provide pleasure 
to a man:  
The insult pornography offers, invariably, to sex is accomplished in the active subordination of 
women: the creation of a sexual dynamic in which the putting-down of women, the suppression of 
women, and ultimately the brutalization of women, is what sex is taken to be (Dworkin, 1985, p. 9) 
Accordingly, pornography gives a false idea of what sex. MacKinnon also considers the 
implications of demonstrating this sexual dynamic of dominance towards women in pornography. 
In her words,  
Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning of what sexuality. Men treat women  as 
who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over  women 
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means that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography is that  way 
(MacKinnon, 1986, p. 65). 
Thus, pornography constructs a wrong image of women and sex. For Dworkin and MacKinnon, the 
harms of pornography are not solely what pornography says, but what it does (1989). They write: 
''Pornography sexualizes inequality and the hatred of women so that men get sexual pleasure from 
hurting women and putting women down'' (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989, p. 73). On this account, 
women are used to produce pornography, which disseminates that women must be hurt in order to 
produce pleasure, and what goes on-screen legitimates real-life violence. Thus, pornography harms 
women and validates hatred towards them, as it teaches men that women must be humiliated and 
hurt.  
Based on this harms that pornography inflicts to women within pornography and in society more 
broadly, both Dworkin and MacKinnon defend that pornography is a form of sexual discrimination 
(MacKinnon, 1993), (Dworkin, 1989) and (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989).  
Moreover, women are powerless in the hands of pornographers to refuse to participate in 
pornography: ''Pornographers promote an image of free consent because it is good for business'' 
(Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989, p. 43). The authors argue that women in pornography are coerced 
to participate, because women's disadvantage in society already presents them fewer economic 
possibilities; however, women are also coerced when pornographers persuade them to do 
pornography, and manipulate them in exchange for money (1989). It is in this sense that 
pornography silences women. The subsequent section will present some developments related to 
this idea.  
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3.3. Implications for the Free Speech of Women 
Langton matured the argument that says that pornography silences women: 
In arguing that pornography harms, or subordinates, or silences women, feminists argue that 
pornographers' freedom to speech must be weighed against the harm it causes to women, or  the 
threat it poses to women's equality, or the threat it poses to women's freedom to speak (1999, p. 116).  
In another work, Langton and Hornsby try to demonstrate how, exactly, does pornography silence 
women, by recurring to the speech acts theory. The authors draw an analogy between pornography 
as form of speech and the speech acts theory developed by the philosopher J. L. Austin (1962). This 
theory states that three processes are crucial for communication: when someone utter words 
(locutionary act) there is a meaning attached to it (illocutionary act), followed by a consequence of 
the illocution (perlocutionary act) (Langton and Hornsby, 1998). When someone speaks, they say 
more than enunciating sounds; so, in the illocutionary process, when the speaker utters words, the 
hearer must be able to listen to them and recognize their meaning (1998); this, they argue, makes 
language a communicative process (1998). It can also happen that some utterance needs context to 
provide the desired meaning. Langton and Hornsby provide the example of the sentence ''I do'': the 
hearer acknowledges two words as an utterance, but, say, in the context of a wedding, the words 
mean that one accepts to get married. Without understanding that context, ''I do'' would not have the 
same connotation.  
As language is a communicative process, Langton and Hornsby stress that the hearer must 
recognize that the speaker is trying to say something with their words, and that understanding (what 
the authors call reciprocity) is enough for the speaker to perform an illocutionary act (1998).  
For them (1998), what happens in the context of pornography is that the reciprocity needed for a 
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''no'' to mean what it means, is absent: imagine that a woman in a pornographic depiction is trying 
to refuse sex. She utters the word ''no'', but the hearer (man) does not recognize that no as a refusal; 
in this case, the woman tried to refuse, but her words were not more than a locution, because the 
hearer does not recognize it as so. This is the illocutionary disablement that pornography 
contributes to. Thus, a woman is able to say ''no'', but the pornographer has the power in his hands 
to determine whether her words are listened to, and whether that no counts as a ''no''. As Langton 
wrote in another piece (2003): ''Let them [the powerless] speak. Let them say whatever they like to 
whomever they like, but stop that speech from counting as an action. More precisely, stop it from 
counting as the action it was intended to be'' (p. 299). Thus, the woman is not silenced by being 
physically prevented to utter words, but she is silenced by obscuring the meaning she wants to 
convey. 
Bird (2002) notes that the argument above does not precisely say how pornography silences 
women. However, the author concedes that the illocutionary disablement is performed trough 
pornographers convincing the audience that women enjoy violent sex and that they fantasize about 
rape; her ''no'' is taken as ''part of the game'' (2002).  
Jacobson (1995) criticizes Langton's application of illocutionary disablement to pornography. For 
Langton, women are disabled at the illocutionary level because their utterances are not taken for 
what they mean, this is, and their ''no'' is not understood as a ''no''. From here it follows that the 
ability to refuse sex relies on the hearer and their recognition of a woman's attempt: if a woman says 
''no'', meaning to refuse sex, she is dependent on the hearer to understand the message. If she was, in 
fact, disabled at the illocutionary level, she had not refused, although she attempted to; Langton and 
Hornsby recall Austin's ''uptake'' as a condition for a fulfilled illocutionary act (1998). If the hearer 
is not able to acknowledge the meaning behind the utterances, the speaker failed at refusing. 
19 
 
 
Transporting this into sex and pornography: a woman might have attempted to say ''no'' to sex, but 
she did not refuse it. This means, according to Jacobson (2005), that no one would ever know 
whether sexual encounters are ever consensual. For Jacobson (1995), if there is not a refusal, this 
means that there cannot be rape either: Jacobson argues that illocutionary speech acts do not need to 
secure uptake, otherwise women would be dependent on men to codify the meaning of their words. 
For Jacobson, this implicates that on Langton's account, the rape of women would be impossible.  
Intuitively, if communication is a process involving reciprocity, perhaps we must accept that uptake 
is indeed necessary; Langton and Hornsby have responded to Jacobson by arguing that the author 
considers that only the uptake would be necessary to a woman being able to refuse (1998); which, 
as we saw above, is not only what Langton and Hornsby argue for; The context of pornography also 
contributes to obscure the meaning behind women's words. 
The importance of the silencing argument in the context of censoring pornography is that it if a 
woman's ''no'' is taken by a ''yes'' in pornography, it would be extremely hard to assess whether a 
woman is consensually participating in pornography. Indeed, as Langton and West argue (1999),  
Women often find themselves unable to alter the score of language games in the ways that they intent 
and find themselves altering the score in ways they did not intent – in both public and private sexual 
conversations, conversations whose score includes the presupposition, introduced and reinforced by 
pornography, that a woman's no often means yes. (p. 314) 
Thus, women in pornography are not in control of the message it creates, and because they fail at 
refusing, pornography perpetrates the idea that women might say ''no'', but what they mean is ''yes''. 
Further on, Langton and West (1999) explain this idea:  
Pornographers...are liars, or background liars, or background blurrers. Presuppositions are introduced 
by pornography, authors innocently or otherwise fail adequately to indicate the line between fiction 
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and background, readers innocently or otherwise take fiction for background, and accordingly come to 
believe certain rape myths. Women, as participants in conversations where rape myths are 
presupposed as a component of conversational score, are silenced and subordinated (p. 318). 
If pornography sexualizes inequalities as Dworkin and MacKinnon proposed (1989), it seems to be 
this way that pornography creates further inequalities and endorses hatred towards women. On this 
account, pornography lies to its audience, which mistakenly takes that lie as truth; and women, the 
victims of that lie, are not able to change neither the message of pornography: ''Pornography makes 
moves which subordinate and silence women, moves which women, as subordinate and silent, 
cannot then adequately challenge'' (Langton & West, 1999, p. 318). 
Braddon-Mitchell and West (2004) also believe that reciprocity within speech is necessary for free 
speech. For them, free speech demands not only distribution of speech in society, but also 
comprehension from the hearers. In their words, 
When we want free speech for ourselves, we want to be able to utter meaningful sentences, not 
because we fetishise the property of having a meaning in some language L, but rather because we 
expect that property to assist in our thoughts being communicated (2004, p. 447). 
The authors remark yet another way in which someone's speech might be interfered with: the 
speaker utters words, they were recognized by the hearers, but their words are simply dismissed 
(2004). It could be that dismissing someone's views after hearing them and recognizing them might 
also be applicable to the argument that pornography interferes with the free speech of women. 
Dismissing someone's ideas, for example, happens when one ridicules the speaker (2004): ''This is, 
we think, the grain of truth in the politically correct thought that ridiculing the powerless and 
oppressed is bad, but ridiculing the establishment is permissible or even desirable'' (2004, p. 451). 
Thus, it could be that not only men fail at recognizing a woman's refusal, but they also dismiss their 
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refusal by ridiculing it.  
So far, we have seen the ways in which women are prevented from consenting to participate in 
pornography. If they are silenced by pornography, as it seems so far to be case, there is a conflict 
between the free speech of women, and the free speech of pornographers.  
However, the First Amendment of the United States protects pornography as a form of free 
expression:  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. (U.S. Const. amend. I) 
When pornographers produce sexually explicit material, they are making use of their right to free 
expression, to produce something that intents to create arousal in its audience. But as we saw 
earlier, pornography may also be harmful to women; by humiliating them and creating more 
inequalities, and by discriminating a group of people given a condition given at birth (Dworkin, 
1989). Thus, it can also be argued that the right to pornography collides with the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States
3
, which recognizes the right to equality (Langton, 1993).  
Furthermore, MacKinnon (1991) considers pornography to be a form of defamation: ''Pornography 
does purvey an ideology about all women; too, pornography of women and men of color sexualizes 
racism. It is in this sense defamatory'' (p.803). In the same piece, MacKinnon asserts that 
pornography is a form of discrimination. She argues,  
                                                 
3 ''All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.'' (U.S. Const. amend. XIV) 
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In the discrimination context, verbal expressions are actionable per se or are evidence of  actionable 
practices, not projected speech; they are smoking guns, not political opinion. No  sexual harassment 
defendant to my knowledge has ever claimed his sexually harassing remarks were protected 
expression (p.805). 
Thus, if pornography collides with women's freedom of speech, if there is a conflict between the 
right to speech between two groups (women and pornographers), it needs to be weighted which 
group's right to speech should be protected against the prejudice of the other (Maitra, 2009).  
I believe this is the problem that liberal scholars pose to the censorship of pornography: until what 
extent should the state restrict pornography, under the claim that it might constitute an obstacle for 
the free speech of women. Thus, in the following section, I shall present Ronald Dworkin's 
objections to the censorship of pornography. 
 
3.4. Dworkin's Objection Against the Censorship of Pornography 
In ''Is There a Right to Pornography?'' (1991), the liberal Ronald Dworkin argues that, if there are 
reasons to censor pornography, they should not be related to freedom of speech; For him, ''[But] we 
should be suspicious of that claim, because the strongest arguments in favor of allowing Mein 
Kampf to be published hardly seem to apply in favor of the novel Whips Incorporated or the film 
Sex Kittens'' (p. 177). For Dworkin, censoring political speech and censoring sexually explicit 
images are different matters, because, for him, pornographic films or novels do not prevent anyone 
for contributing for the political exchange of ideas. 
This allows Dworkin the possibility of developing two strategies in favor of the regulation of 
pornography which do not involve the direct justification of protection women's freedom of speech. 
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These strategies are the goal-based strategy, and the rights-based strategy. The first strategy 
supports that censoring pornography would be much more dangerous compared to the alternative of 
not censoring. The rights-based strategy defends that even if pornography makes society worse off, 
it would be wrong to censor pornography, because it would violate the rights of those who do not 
oppose to censorship (1991). 
The author criticizes goal-based arguments, because he believes that it would be highly speculative 
whether or not censorship would make society better off in the long run; In other words, goal-based 
strategies compel us to allow more speech, which we might now agree with, at the same time that 
we would not be sure whether or not in the bigger picture, the prevalence of other ideas, would 
contribute positively to society (1991). Dworkin writes, ''This argument has the weakness of 
providing contingent reasons for convictions that we do not hold contingently'' (p. 193). However, 
Dworkin continues,  
But the parallel arguments in the case of most pornography seem silly, and very few of those who 
defend peoples' right to read pornography in private would actually claim that the community or any 
individual is better off with more pornography rather than less (p. 193). 
Then, Dworkin analyzes the rights-based strategy, through what he considers to be the putative right 
to moral independence. Through this approach, the state should not prohibit the private 
consumption of pornography; the state should have a permissive position concerning pornography, 
if there was no clear evidence linking private consumption of pornography to violence towards 
women. In this situation, those who oppose to pornography would not have to see in public 
environment, and pornography consumers could still have access to pornography. According to 
Dworkin, this strategy would be contra utilitarian, because this strategy assumes that pornography 
should not be censored even if the whole of the community would be better off with it in the long 
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run (1991). In Dworkin's words,  
If someone is denied liberty of sexual practice in virtue of a utilitarian justification that depends 
critically on other peoples' moralistic preferences, then he suffers disadvantage in virtue of the fact that 
his concept of a proper life is already despised by others (p. 207).  
Therefore, for Dworkin, no one should be prohibited of following what they consider to be the good 
life for them, unless there is real reason to prove that, in this case, pornography is the link between 
sexual images and violence of women. Otherwise, those who want to consume pornography would 
be prejudiced considering their views of the good life.  
Dworkin is in favor of the rights-based strategy, as he believes that individuals should be free to 
pursue their own view of the good life, and should have the right to make their own choices, even if 
the majority of society disagrees with them (1991).  
Based on this, Dworkin also dismisses the feminist argument which says that pornography silences 
women; for him, that argument would not be sufficient to censor pornography, because what is at 
stake are not free speech concerns, but rather, for Dworkin, moralistic views about the good life and 
pornography (1993). In his words, ''Because those who want to forbid pornography know that 
offensiveness alone does not justify censorship, however, they disguise their repulsion as concern 
that pornography will cause rape, or silence women, or harm the women who make it'' (1993, p. 2). 
Thus, for Dworkin, the radical feminists are much more concerned with moral values against the 
depiction of sexually explicit images, than with the harm pornography that may cause.  
 
3.5. Attempts at Regulating Pornography: The Minneapolis Ordinance 
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin first attempted at regulating pornography by proposing 
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and anti-pornography ordinance to the City Council of Minneapolis:   
In 1983, the Minneapolis City Council convened hearings on a new zoning law that would prohibit all 
pornography in the city. The council invited MacKinnon and Dworkin to testify against the harms 
caused by pornography. The noted feminists proposed eliminating pornography via an alternative to 
zoning (Rubin & Alexander, 1996, p. 81). 
Brest and Vandenberg write (1987) that, given that Minneapolis had already an ordinance against 
sex discrimination, MacKinnon proposed to extend the ordinance to make pornography subject to 
lawsuits based on the harms it infringes to women. For this, Dworkin and MacKinnon organized 
hearings with victims of pornography to testify against its dangers: ''They [the victims] spoke of 
pornography being forced on them in ways that gave them no choice about seeing the pornography 
or later performing the sex'' (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989, p. 34). In their words, ''The Ordinance, 
unlike the pornography and its defenses, was written in the speech of what has been their silence'' 
(p. 34).  
According to Dworkin and MacKinnon, the Ordinance had four causes of action: ''coercion into 
pornography'', ''having pornography forced on you'', ''being assaulted because of particular 
pornography'', and for ''trafficking in pornography'' (1989). Thus, the person injured by pornography 
in one or more of the following manners could seek legal consequences.  According to Brest and 
Vandenberg (1987), the injured coerced to pornography would have the right to demand damage 
compensations and an injunction; those who were assaulted because of pornography could sue the 
''producers, distributors and exhibitors'' (p.619); and, against the trafficking in pornography, women 
could sue ''anyone in the pornographic business'' (p.619). 
Consequently, the enforcement of the Ordinance that Dworkin and MacKinnon draw could be done 
through lawsuits, damages or injunctions (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989). This is, the injured could 
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demand monetary compensations or demand the prohibition of the distribution of certain material, if 
that affected them in one of the four ways mentioned above. 
The Minneapolis City Council passed the Ordinance, yet the mayor vetoed it (Brest and 
Vandenberg, 1987). According to the authors, the mayor's concern related to First Amendment core 
values: ''Foremost among the mayor's specific objections was the ordinance's effect on free speech: 
The law was too vague to provide adequate guidance for legitimate booksellers and theater 
operators'' (1987, p. 645).  
Nonetheless, a similar ordinance, whose definition of pornography restricted it to sexual violence, 
was passed in Indianapolis City (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989). However, the ordinance was found 
unconstitutional:  
In 1985, in a lawsuit brought by a media group (some pornographers, most not) against the City of 
Indianapolis for passing the Ordinance, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that 
the Ordinance violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech (1989, p. 58). 
It these sense, Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon consider that the courts chose to favor 
pornographer's right to continue to practice discrimination against women and their right to speak 
over women (1989).  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this section, I have reviewed some of the literature that analyzes pornography, freedom of speech 
and censorship together. I have also reviewed Dworkin and MacKinnon's attempt at regulating 
pornography in the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances.  
The debate between the feminists and Ronald Dworkin represents a dispute between the right to 
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free speech of women, which feminists believe is compromised with pornography, and the freedom 
of expression liberals consider to be fundamental. It could be said to be a dispute between equality 
and the liberty to do and consume pornography; in the case of the ordinances, it seems that the right 
to free speech of pornographers has prevailed;  
If one must choose between equality and liberty, considering the issue at stake, I believe that the 
concern for equality should prevail, since women and minorities are the main victims of mainstream 
pornography. However, I am skeptical about the feminist claim that state regulation could protect 
women and minorities by censoring pornography in the way the ordinances attempted, because that 
kind of regulation may entail many risks for those who are already vulnerable in the hands of 
pornographers.  
Therefore, in the following chapter, I will analyze some of the negative consequences that the 
censorship of pornography could bring to women and minorities, supported by other scholars who 
have argued against a ban on pornography.  
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4. Argument: Censoring Pornography Would Not Solve Concerns with Gender Equality 
4.1. Introduction 
Hardly one could deny that pornography does not any harm to women and society more broadly; 
pornography, as Dworkin and MacKinnon have demonstrated, creates an imaginary image of what 
sex is, and legitimates that it is acceptable to hurt a woman in exchange for sex. We have also seen 
how the free speech of women (more precisely, the capacity of a woman to refuse to have sex) 
might be obscured in the context of pornography. Shortly: pornographic depictions transform a 
woman ''no'' into a ''yes'', by teaching that a woman that in the sexual context, that is ''part of the 
game'' (Bird, 2002). Since the man does not recognize her refusal, the woman fails at consenting. 
We have also seen one of the liberal arguments against the censorship of pornography, represented 
by the work of Ronald Dworkin. Furthermore, the previous chapter analyzed the Ordinance that 
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon proposed, in an attempt to regulate pornography and 
ban violent sexually explicit material from Minneapolis and Indianapolis.  
Now, in this chapter, I propose to argue against those restrictive policies to pornography, because 
they would affect women and minorities negatively. To be precise, I will argue against the kind of 
strict regulation that MacKinnon and Dworkin advocated in the Minneapolis and Indianapolis 
ordinances. Thus, I will argue against censoring pornography as in banning or making it illegal. I 
will defend that, although the argument that pornography silences women is a strong one, censoring 
pornography is not desirable: Accepting the claim that the free speech of women is restricted with 
the production, distribution and consumption of pornography, I will argue that the censorship of 
sexually explicit material does not guarantee that the free speech of women is protected. In other 
words, I intent to demonstrate that, even if we hold the claim that pornography is harmful to 
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women, there are good reasons to believe that censoring pornography would have a negative impact 
on women's lives, and would restrict their capacity of refusal even more. 
I will divide my argument in four parts. I will argue that censoring pornography, as means as 
protecting women's free speech, could worsen the economic situation of women in the industry, 
thus leaving women more vulnerable and willing to participate in illegal pornography; then, I will 
demonstrate that focusing on pornography as a central agent in gender inequality leaves aside other 
crucial forms of misogyny present in media; I will also argue that censoring pornography would 
threaten women's autonomy over their bodies; Lastly, I will argue that pornography has the 
potential to promote a more ethical kind of sexual education, challenging many of the mainstream 
pornography misconceptions. 
 
4.2. The censorship is not desirable because it provides no economic alternative for women in 
pornography, making women more vulnerable to coercion and exploitation 
The purpose of this section is to argue that if women are prevented from refusal because of the way 
in which mainstream pornography operates, a formal ban on pornography would not resolve the 
concerns with women and minorities' well being, because it would not prevent pornographers from 
exploiting these two groups. Thus, I propose that we discuss the negative consequences of 
censoring pornography, taking into account the way in which the radical feminists said pornography 
would harm women.  
As we saw previously, Dworkin and MacKinnon consider that women are coerced into 
pornography, because they have fewer possibilities than men. So, if we consider women in 
pornography as sex workers which were, in Dworkin and MacKinnon's terms, coerced into the 
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industry, which alternative could the censorship of pornography provide to them? In asking this 
question, I am not asking if society would be better-off without pornography (Dworkin, 1991), but 
rather, if the women depicted in pornography would be better-off outside the industry. I am 
interested in assessing whether the living conditions of women and minorities would improve if 
pornography was banned.  
Some scholars have been arguing against the censorship of pornography because they consider that 
censoring pornography would harm even more the rights of women in the industry. Some of these 
authors consider that the future of the women in pornography would not be any better (if not worst) 
if pornography was to be censored.  
Nadine Strossen is one of the authors that hold this position. She argues (1996) that the censorship 
of pornography is not desirable, because free speech has traditionally been one of tools at the 
disposition of those who have been the most discriminated. She argues that, ''As even censorship 
advocates recognize, any censorship scheme would not prevent the production of all pornography, 
but rather, would drive that production underground'' (1996, p. 461).  
Grey (1988) has argued that MacKinnon is mostly concerned with the second group of women 
which pornography might hurt – not the pornography actresses, but all women in society; for him, 
this makes it possible to MacKinnon to defend the censorship of pornography without addressing 
the ways in which the women in pornography are exploited. Although I partially disagree with this 
position (considering what was presented in the literature review chapter), Grey (1988) points out a 
relevant criticism to the censorship of pornography worth examining:  
MacKinnon's solution would, at best, remove the opportunity for exploitation, only to leave the 
victims susceptible to virtually certain exploitation in another context. Her solution is therefore neither 
necessary nor sufficient to address the very real,  pressing, and particularized harm she has identified 
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(p. 1600).  
On this account, banning pornography would not provide a solution to women in pornography. As 
presented in the last chapter, I believe that Ronald Dworkin would defend a similar position (1993).  
Thus, on these terms, considering that many women in pornography come from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, pornography at least provides to them the means to survive; if pornography was to be 
censored or strictly regulated, then, many of these women would be exploited anyways by different 
people or forms of work. If, as Strossen (1996) suggests, pornography would go underground, it is 
possible that women and minorities would be willing to accept even more precarious working 
conditions, harmful for their bodies and sexual health, in exchange of money or other benefits. This 
would mean that the censorship of pornography could put women in such a vulnerable position that 
women's capacity of refusal would be even lower.  
Furthermore, if the pornographic industry goes more underground, and if this implicates that a 
woman's bargaining condition would dramatically decrease, then this would also affect negatively 
how women in pornography are seen, further contributing to their stigmatization. Borrowing the 
words of Shrage (1994), ''Because sex work violates conventional norms of sexual morality and 
female respectability, sex workers are vulnerable to social subordination, disrespect, and pity'' (p. 
62). If this is the situation of women in pornography, it is possible that these scenarios would be 
amplified if pornography was made illegal, marginalizing women and minorities on pornography. 
Not only would they be much more vulnerable to be coerced into pornography, but also because 
society could see these sex workers even more negatively, damaging their self-esteem. This is 
important, because probably their self-esteem could influence the prospects of leaving the industry 
if they wish to do so. Ironically, although women in pornography are the most socially stigmatized, 
they have much more visibility than the ones who oppress them, the pornographers. Thus, banning 
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pornography would contribute negatively to those who are already powerless, without 
marginalizing those who use women and minorities to make profit out of them. I believe that the 
sort of regulation that the Minneapolis ordinance requested, would not work in favor of women in 
pornography, because it provides no other alternative to them. Although they could sue 
pornographers, and ask for compensations of damage, they would not have an alternative after 
pornography. Nonetheless, the compensations that the Ordinance proposed could reimburse women 
for the pain caused (Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1989), at the same time that it could also work as an 
incentive for women to leave pornography. 
Although the aim of censoring pornography is to protect those who are depicted, and the women in 
''real life'' who suffer from pornography, it is hard to believe that creating restrictions to its 
production and distribution would stop pornographers from doing it; If the respect for women's 
bodies would not be enough for them not to produce such content – and if human trafficking and 
rape are a reality -  it would be naïve to expect that the pornographers would respect the rule of law.  
Thus, I am afraid that such strict regulations to pornography could hurt even more women and 
minorities. The situation of women and minorities in the industry may not improve, but rather 
decline; they would be much more exposed to exploitative conditions, and thus would not benefit if 
pornography would go underground. It could happen that those who watch pornography would also 
be at disadvantage, because they view of the good life is already socially stigmatized (Dworkin, 
1981). 
Nonetheless, my concern at this stage is not with the audience, but with the life conditions of those 
who suffer the most with the pornographic industry. If pornography went more underground, this 
could have a dangerous impact on the socioeconomic conditions of women and minorities in the 
industry, creating more conditions for their exploitation. Moreover, as argued above, measurements 
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to ban pornography could also lead to an increased stigma of women in pornography. This could 
have the consequence of women suffering even more discrimination, which I believe would not be 
in their best interest.  
Considering that women and minorities have a central role in the debate around the censorship of 
pornography, it is crucial to determine whether their socio-economic situation would improve if 
pornography was made illegal. As we have seen in this section, censoring pornography may entail 
many risks for women and minorities, leaving them more defenseless in the hands of 
pornographers; Thus, perhaps, to protect those who are most affected by the pornographic industry, 
the censorship of pornography is not a desirable means to safeguard women, even if we consider 
that pornography silences women and harms society more broadly.  
 
4.3. Placing excessive importance on pornography as the main agent in gender inequalities ignores 
other violent – but not always sexually explicit – content 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the radical feminists consider pornography to have a very 
crucial role in the spectrum of gender inequalities: as Dworkin and MacKinnon argued, 
pornography sexualizes inequality, being itself a depiction of women's submission, and creating 
further submission of women on real-life, by providing an inaccurate image of women and their 
sexuality. As we saw, MacKinnon even considered this inaccurate image as a form of defamation 
towards women. If this is the case, pornography indeed plays an important role in the message it 
transmit about women, namely, that women are ''whores'' (Dworkin, 1989). 
The Ordinance Dworkin and MacKinnon created does justice to the pervasiveness of pornography. 
However, other scholars have been criticizing the attention the two have attributed to pornography, 
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because it would ignore other forms of misogyny in society. Given these claims, I defend that 
focusing excessively on pornography as a form of inequalities leaves aside many other misogynistic 
messages the mainstream media provide. Moreover, I argue that it would be unrealistic to expect 
considerable advancements towards gender inequalities through the censorship of pornography. 
Thus, assuming that regulatory efforts like the Minneapolis ordinance would succeed in suppressing 
pornography, I believe there are reasons to be skeptical about the contribution of the absence of 
pornography to society. Grey (1988) considers that hardly all misogyny would disappear along with 
pornography; Sunstein (1986) also defends this position: ''If pornography were abolished, sexual 
inequality would hardly disappear'' (p. 601).  
Although pornography might be a powerful means of depicting violence toward women because it 
is explicit, other sexist and misogynistic views are also perpetrated in society by mainstream media, 
which might be more accessible to people than pornography. Duggan (1993) has a similar position, 
arguing that in the same way one criticizes misogyny in sexually explicit materials, one must also 
criticize and oppose to misogyny present in other forms of mainstream media. Moreover, ''[but] it 
makes as much sense to organize a group called Women Against the Novel as it does to organize 
Women Against Porn. We're against misogyny in sexually explicit materials. We're not against 
sexually explicit materials per se'' (1993, p. 34). Hence, perhaps censoring pornography may imply 
that because it is explicit content, it is somehow more dangerous than sexist and hatred practices in 
everyday life. Schrage (2005) argues in a similar fashion: 
Some pornography is socially irresponsible although the same could be said of extremely violent and 
pointless films. I have argued that there is no reason to think that material that is sexually graphic is 
more powerfully degrading to women than non-pornographic material that valorizes sexist attitudes or 
other offensive views, such as racist or homophobic ones (2005, p.  63). 
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On this account, pornography would not be more dangerous than content in other media forms.  
There are other messages which also contribute negatively to society, and pornography is only one 
of them.  
Searles (1994) even defends that sexist content outside pornography is more harmful: ''[In fact], 
sexist images of women which occur outside pornography are all the more powerful than those 
within pornography because of their wide acceptance and validity'' (p. 480-481). Indeed, although 
pornography is easily accessible, other media might have more impact on everyday lives; because 
of that, they are taken as more natural, and that is why much of the misogyny perpetrated outside 
pornography might be more harmful. 
Moreover, Duggan, Hunter & Vance (1993) question the importance MacKinnon and Dworkin 
attribute to pornography as being the most importance force of women's oppression:  
It need hardly be said that pornography did not lead to the burning of witches or the English common 
law treatment of women as chattel property. If anything functioned then as the p rime communication 
medium for woman-hating, it was probably religion (p. 155) 
The authors argue that the sexual explicitness of pornography is one of the major reasons that far-
right forces and radical feminists aligned with the ordinances (1993). For them, other media images 
that are violent are not questioned in the same way pornography is. They write: ''So far, those who 
have produced violent films have not been found blameworthy when third persons acted out the 
violence depicted'' (1993, p. 162). If this would be the case, the authors believe that other forms of 
violence present in mainstream media should also be censored in the way the ordinances proposed; 
they argue that,  
If this were to change [if one could blame a violent film producer because someone acted out the 
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violence], it would mean, for example, that the producer of the TV movie The Burning Bed, which 
told the true story of a battered wife who set fire to her sleeping  husband, could be sued if a woman 
who saw the film killed her husband in a similar way. The result, of course, would be the end of films 
depicting real violence in the lives of women (1993, p. 162).  
If other violent, but not sexually explicit movies, were to be censored because of their violence 
towards a group of people, even if that movie aimed at bringing the attention, say, to racist issues, 
one could not accuse the producer if a third party acted out on it (1993). But violent films are not 
censored in the same way the ordinances proposed that pornography would be, and it would be very 
hard to prove that the depiction of violence was the cause of harm (1993, p. 162). 
So, perhaps according to these authors, we could look at pornography as a form of oppression and 
silencing of a group of people, but not blame pornography as the most important cause for gender 
inequalities. If one is to censor violent pornography, then one is also to censor violent movies. 
Thus, to be congruent with the feminist goal of censoring material which is violent and 
misogynistic to women, one would have to censor much more images which are not pornographic, 
but are also violent.  
This does not mean that MacKinnon and Dworkin do not condemn other forms of sexism and 
hatred in mainstream media, but it makes us wonder what would be the limits of censorship. For 
them, pornography is an important target, because the difference between pornography and other 
forms of misogyny in the media lies in the coercion of pornography, that does not happen in other 
media: ''Indicators of the difference are that no one is coerced into performing for Calvin Klein 
commercials; no one is tied up in front of “The Secret Storm” and forced to enact its scenes later;’’.  
Moreover, Meyer (1994) also argues against placing too much importance to pornography as form 
of hatred. For the author, the effect of pornography is also smaller compared to other forms of 
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represented hatred: 
[Finally], the pro-porn suppression effort wastes valuable resources because, although porn may 
contribute to the notion that women are worthy targets of male domination and abuse, its impact  is 
marginal in comparison with the myriad mainstream images and practices that influence societal 
attitudes towards women (p.1101). 
Indeed, given the claims that other media might affect in a more dangerous way how the society 
perceives women, targeting pornography would leave aside other inaccurate depictions. And, 
although it could formally contribute against the discrimination of women, it is possible that efforts 
to regulate pornography would have a small impact on the broader picture of gender equality. 
 
4.4. Censoring pornography would threaten women's autonomy over their bodies 
In this section, I propose that banning pornography poses a challenge to women's autonomy over 
their bodies, considering feminist perspectives against patriarchy and male domination. 
Although the radical feminists defend the censorship of pornography as means for the state to 
protect women from sexual discrimination, other scholars have argued that this would be an 
incongruence with feminist struggles against patriarchy: ''One is tempted to ask in astonishment, 
how can this be happening? How can feminists be entrusting the patriarchal state with the task of 
legally distinguishing between permissible and impermissible sexual images?'' (Duggan, Hunter & 
Vance, 1993, p. 134). Grey (1988) also criticizes the legal attempts MacKinnon has made towards 
the censorship of pornography. The author advances,  
The notion that women must be protected from visual or aural representation of male sexual 
dominance ironically allows the (usually male) judge to play the far more insidious role of father-
figure, protecting his weak charge from the hostile environment of the outside world (p. 1611). 
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The last passages strongly imply that the attack on pornography gives to a male-dominated body the 
power to decide over women's bodies and choices, which is to some extent contradictory to the 
feminists. On one hand, the radical feminists commitment to protect women's speech compels them 
to demand that women must be protected under the law in favor of the free speech of 
pornographers; on the other hand, in order to protect them, they give to the state (a patriarchal 
instance), the power to regulate pornography. Perhaps this is a small incongruence considering the 
dangers of pornography at stake, but it still is something worth considering in relation to what could 
be women's empowerment against male domination. 
Furthermore, it has been argued, that censoring pornography would mean to censor women view's 
on sexuality, as well as censoring their will to participate in sexual experiences (Katz, 1993). 
According to the author, if we concede that women are entitled to the right of consuming 
pornography in the same way men are, we need to allow women to speak up for and against 
pornography, even if that entails more women producing, acting, distributing and watching to 
pornography: 'Many women, many feminists, are determined to dispel the myths that censorship is 
good for women, that women want censorship, and those who support censorship speak for women'' 
(1993, p. 20). Thus, perhaps women want pornography, and perhaps many women would disagree 
with strict regulations to pornography. In the words of Ann Russo, ''[Thus], liberation is, for 
women, to have sexual power and control, and, more importantly to be able to express and 
articulate their own desires and strategize for their own pleasure'' (1987, p. 110).  
This way, women's liberation demands empowerment through sexuality; thus, the censorship of 
pornography could threaten the possibility of women expressing their sexualities through their 
consenting to participate in pornography. 
Also, some authors argue that the radical feminists hold a conservative view on sexuality, which 
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may be stigmatizing for women and other sexual minorities (Strossen, 1996; Ferguson, 1984). 
Although they view sadomasochist practices as a form of violence towards women (Dworkin, 
1989), those practices may be as well consented, and even involving the exchange of traditional 
gender roles: 
Moreover, the norms and practices of S/M communities generally do not single women out for 
subordination or humiliation. Many men enjoy being ''bottoms'' or submitting to simulated sexual 
violation, and being a bottom or top is not restricted by gender. Sadomasochist pornography, which 
involves the filming or photographing of S/M scenes, also takes place in a context with rules that 
protect the participant's welfare (Shrage, 2005, p. 61).  
Thus, Shrage (2005) argues that it is important to contextualize the violence one sees on screen, and 
that it is important to distinguish from acted violence, to real-life violence, because violence on 
screen a simulated kind of violence. The author argues that in correspondence to what happens in 
violent movies, the violence on screen is no real violence; and that if one knew that the violence in 
movies was real, then people would not enjoy watching those (2005). 
Additionally, if pornography was made illegal, it is possible that it would lead to the stigmatization 
of female and minority consumers, who could feel that their sexual desires are socially disapproved, 
further contributing to the their discrimination. In the words of Abrams (1995), ''The attack on 
pornography obscured the sexual pleasure women had been able to achieve, even under oppressive 
conditions'' (p. 305).  
Moreover, Strossen (1996) emphasizes that censorship efforts have hidden important information 
concerning women's rights and sexuality. The author argues, ''Of particular importance for the 
current pornography debate, laws permitting the suppression of sexually-oriented information have 
often been used to suppress information essential for women's rights, including reproductive 
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freedom'' (p. 470). With this statement, Strossen aims to demonstrate that the censorship to 
pornography could also suppress material relevant to women about their sexuality and rights, which 
has been the case of United States' anti-obscenity laws (1996).  
 
4.5. Pornography has the potential to promote a more ethical kind of sexual education, challenging 
mainstream pornography misconceptions 
It has been suggested in the previous arguments that censoring pornography could implicate that 
other forms of sexual expression would be also regulated. Namely, the censorship of pornography 
could also ban other forms of sexual education concerning sexual health and consensual sexual 
relations.  
The following passage exemplifies some of the ways in which pornography could contribute 
positively to:  
Some examples of feminist concerns that could be harmed by restrictions on sexually explicit speech 
include working to overcome the virgin/whore dichotomy that constrains the way that women lead 
their lives and affects the way that women are perceived, providing better sex education to young 
adults to help them develop healthy sexual identities and to arm them with knowledge about sexually 
transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and sexual abuse, striving to distinguish between sex and violence, 
and breaking down sexual stereotypes and roles in all areas of society (Searles, 1994, p. 487). 
This way, pornography could provide better sexual education, in an alternative to mainstream 
pornography. As it was previously remarked in this thesis, Andrea Dworkin (1989) contextualizes 
''whores'' in the lexicon of a male-dominated society. Thus, promoting more pornography which 
could question this and other assumptions about women and gender roles could be a positive 
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contribute to elevate women's status through pornographic depictions. Also, as Shrage (2005) 
argued, it is important to contextualize violence on screen; This, I believe, should also be in the 
interest of the radical feminists, given that pornography works by obscuring this distinction.  
Moreover, promoting sexual health and raising awareness about sexually transmitted diseases, 
could also contribute positively to healthier sexual relations.  
Given that women's sexuality is still a taboo nowadays, and given that pornography has the power 
to reach a wide audience, pornography should be treated as a tool to fight against sexist, 
misogynistic and racist speech. Again, in the words of Searles (1994), ''One of the best ways to 
combat pornography and its effects is to use it to educate people'' (p. 488).  
Imagine, for example, feminist pornographers and women producing a kind of pornography in 
which women's and men's body parts are depicted, but in which women ''teach'' men about the 
importance of consent in sexual relations; imagine that this is a dialogue two heterosexual people 
are having while preparing for intercourse. Or, imagine, that in a given sexually explicit depiction, 
both women and men are actively consenting to participate in sex and that in the same depiction, it 
is obvious that at least one of them is using a contraceptive method; Following the idea that 
pornography is a form of sexual education, it could be used to depict sexual healthy practices, 
which would prioritize, say, active consent by both parts; This does not ensure that the actresses 
were not coerced in the radical feminist sense, but it might ensure that the audience retrieves the 
positive message of the depiction: that contraceptive methods matter, and that consent is essential. I 
believe that these examples could belong to the pornographic sphere (and not to the erotica sphere) 
as, if argued above, there is a contextualization of what is depicted; There could be violence, but it 
is crucial that the depiction distinguishes between disrespecting people's bodies without permission, 
and asking them for their active consent, in contrast to the idea that mainstream pornography seeks 
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the ''free consent'' of women that Dworkin and MacKinnon (1989) criticized.  
Thus, in the same way that men and women learn about exploiting women's bodies in the kind of 
pornography the radicals were opposed to, they can also learn through pornography the importance 
of consent.  
Nothing of this is, in fact, new. Feminist pornographers have been defending some of these ideas 
and have argued the importance of pornography in the context of sexual education, emphasizing the 
ways in which more pornography could contribute to sex-positive practices
4
. If we consider sexual 
expression as an important part of human life, not censoring pornography could provide minorities 
such as transgender people, the opportunity to create sexually explicit material friendly to the 
realities these groups of people may face. Not censoring pornography thus opens the possibility for 
other kinds of pornography, which aim is to educate its audience and can also provide a form of 
pleasure which intent is to be the less exploitative possible.  
 
4.6. Discussion: Are There Alternatives to the Censorship of Pornography? 
In the previous sections, I have presented some of the arguments against the censorship of 
pornography. They relate to the dangers censoring might bring for women and minorities, which 
could be prejudiced if measurements such as the ones the ordinances proposed were took in place.  
If the production and distribution of pornography denies women the freedom to speak, regulating 
pornography should ensure that women's speech is formally protected by law. However, as I 
presented in this chapter, given that strict regulations to pornography may also harm women and 
                                                 
4 As an example of this, the work The Feminist Porn Book (2013) reunites a collection of essays written by both by 
scholars and sex workers, about feminist and more ethical pornography. 
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minorities, regulations to pornography might not produce the desired effect.  
I have argued that censoring pornography could promote the production of illegal pornography, 
which could leave women and minorities more exposed to dangerous situations, such as trafficking 
and rape. Moreover, if pornography was banned, women and minorities would be left with no other 
alternative or means to survive. I have also argued that censoring pornography would not guarantee 
that the hatred towards women would diminish; first, strict regulations such as the ones the 
Ordinance proposed could not guarantee that the distribution of pornographic material would stop; 
second, if these regulations could avoid that the material was circulated, it would only protect 
women from one kind of misogyny, but it would ignore the role that other media have in 
discriminating against women; Thus, this kind of regulation would have a small impact in society, 
considering all the other forms of misogyny in commercials or television. Too, I have argued that to 
be congruent with the feminist struggle against patriarchy, one would have to defend the censorship 
of a wider range of violent media materials; I have also demonstrated that the censorship of 
pornography would threaten women's autonomy over their bodies, by inhibiting forms of sexual 
expression, which are a fundamental part of human lives, and by providing the idea that all women 
despise pornography; Lastly, I have argued that pornography has the potential to promote healthy 
sexual practices and educate for consensuality in sexual relations, deconstructing many of the 
misconceptions of mainstream pornography, something which would not be possible if 
pornography was regulated.  
Through the arguments which I have presented, I have left aside concerns related to the individual 
right to consume pornography that Dworkin defends (1981). I believe that, given that pornography 
is considered to threaten mainly two groups of people (women and minorities), it is important to 
focus on their oppression, this is, to focus on the ways in which censorship may be harmful to those 
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groups of people who are already discriminated against.  
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon have presented very strong claims considering what 
pornography does to women; their arguments fit a society which is shaped by gender inequalities. 
With the authors, I share the idea that women indeed face many disadvantages considering men. 
However, contra Dworkin and MacKinnon, I am skeptical that censoring or banning pornography 
would do justice to the inequalities that women and minorities suffer. I agree that pornography 
creates a language which purpose is to obscure the message of women's refusal, and I understand 
that, under the law, women's right to free speech might be protected. But it remains unclear whether 
pornographers would respond positively the law, and if regulations to pornography would give a 
positive contribute to women's socio-economic situation. Also, I believe that the free speech of 
women could only be formally recognized; in practical terms, if pornographers would still 
disrespect the law and produce illegal pornography, how would a woman's capacity of refusal 
improve?  
I am also skeptical that, after the ordinances, pornography could be restricted, because of the 
missing link between pornography and harm. Hence, I am interesting in assessing whether banning 
pornography is the only way to provide women and minorities a voice. Furthermore, I am interested 
in knowing if there are other alternatives to avoid the exploitation of women and minorities which 
do not involve a strict regulation of sexually explicit materials.  
In my belief, one of those ways could be by promoting that more pornography is created by and for 
women and minorities, to challenge many of the misogynistic discourses created by mainstream 
pornography; as I have presented before, this is one of the intentions of the so-called feminist 
pornography. Although some of the anti-pornography arguments I have presented here may be very 
close to this kind of pornography, it is not my intention to develop its nature and implications 
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extensively.  
Nonetheless, I propose that we consider that women participate in the production pornography, as 
means for them to represent their views on sexuality, and as means to fight back against the 
exploitative narratives of mainstream pornography. Furthermore, I believe that regulating 
pornography as a form of sex work could avoid the exploitation and violation of women and 
minorities: some degree of regulation of pornography as form of work is needed to ensure that, to 
some extent, no one was coerced in participating in pornography.  
Women have the possibility of creating their own pornography, challenging the industry of 
mainstream pornography, and creating their own views on sexuality. Possibly, in the long run, if 
women create and produce more pornography, pornography need not be humiliation and 
degradation; Allowing women and minorities to take part in the process of making pornography 
could be a first step to represent their views on sexuality and consent. Even if, in the current state of 
arts, women's refusal is impeded with mainstream pornography, promoting their participation in 
decision making aspects of producing pornography could help elevating women's status in the 
industry. 
If pornography is considered a male-dominated industry, we should reconsider whether it could 
benefit from women's participation in decision-making aspects of pornography production; It is also 
important that we reconsider the idea that women would only subjugate themselves to pornography 
if no other choice was available for them; many women may want pornography, and perhaps they 
should not be impeded of participating in the process. 
Because pornography has disadvantaged mainly women, I believe women would be much more 
careful in the way they would depict sexual explicit content, even if violent. Women producing and 
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distributing more pornography could make visible women's perspectives on sexuality: ''If women 
don't create their own erotic visions, their own sexual language, men will continue to do it for us 
and we'll never fully understand our own unique sexual nature'' (Royalle, p. 68-69). 
Promoting female-made pornography, however, would not suffice to protect women from the hands 
of pornographers. Duggan, Hunter & Vance (1993) argue that providing working conditions for 
those in the industry would be one of the most effective ways to ensure that women are not coerced 
to participate into pornography: 
Women do not become pornography models because society is egalitarian and they exercise a ''free 
choice'', but neither do they ''choose'' this work because they have lost all power to deliberate 
volitional behavior. Modeling or acting for pornography, like prostitution, can be a means of survival 
for those limited options. For some women, at some points in their lives, it is a rational economic 
decision. Not every woman regrets having made it, although no woman should have to settle for it. 
The fight should be to expand the options, as well as to insure job safety for women who do become 
pornography models (p. 159-160). 
This last stance represents what could be a better solution for women and minorities in 
pornography: create more female-friendly pornography, as well as insuring, at the same time, the 
minimal working conditions for pornography workers. This way, women's financial situation would 
not be neglected, thus allowing them to pursue another career and leave the industry if they wish to 
do so. Schrage (2005) argues that sex work must be treated as a form of work, in which the workers 
receive the same benefits they would do in another job. In her words, pornography demand other 
forms of regulation which do not include banning: ''This means that sex workers must have a 
reasonably tolerant legal and social environment in which to work, health and safety protections, 
enforceable employment contracts, and so on'' (p. 62).  
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In relation to prostitution as a form of sex work Zatz (1997) argues that women could only be 
prejudiced if sex work is not understood as such. In her words, 
Exclusion from social benefits premised on employment (e.g., worker's compensation, disability and 
unemployment insurance, the earned income tax credit) and the added burdens of illegality undermine 
the possibilities for financial independence and encourage reliance on pimps and alliances with 
organized crime and drug trafficking (p. 304).  
I believe that the same should be applied to pornography: it could avoid, to some extent that women 
would not be forced to enter in pornography, allowing them a relatively stable environment, thus 
providing them the means for more independence and even possibilities leave the industry. 
Moreover, as it was previously advanced, treating pornography as a form of work, could also 
contribute positively to the status of women, diminishing the stigma associated with women in 
pornography. Thus, it is possible that the two possibilities introduced here could perhaps empower 
women in pornography and provide them the means to leave the industry, while at the same time 
reducing the social stigma pornography workers face.  
Nonetheless, the main focus of this thesis is not to determine in which ways pornography could be 
beneficial to those which it traditionally exploits, but to demonstrate that censoring pornography 
could worsen women's situation and thus contributing to more gender inequalities.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued against the censorship of pornography and have also attempted to 
outline two possible alternatives to the censorship of pornography that could empower women to 
appropriate themselves from pornography and create their own narratives. 
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The biggest challenge to what was proposed on this chapter, is what Langton considered to be the 
challenge to fight speech with more speech: ''Whether women can fight speech with more speech 
depends on whether, and to what extent, women can speak'' (1993, p. 314). This chapter focused on 
four negative impacts of censoring pornography, demonstrating in which ways censoring 
pornography could hurt women and minorities even more, and thus affecting their negotiating 
capacity of refusing to participate in pornography.  
Thus, if censoring pornography would not entirely mean that women's voices were being heard, I 
have also suggested that we think of ways in which pornography could be beneficial to women. 
I consider that, even if women are economically disadvantaged compared to men, an analysis of 
pornography should focus on solutions for the exploitation of women, and not leaving them more 
vulnerable to other forms of exploitation; Pornography may be a powerful vehicle for silencing 
women, but women must create more pornography to challenge the misogyny of mainstream 
pornography. Additionally, as I advanced here, women and minorities should have the conditions 
for the fulfillment of that task: sex workers must be treated as such.  
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to answer the research question: ''Is the Censorship of Pornography Good of 
Gender Equality?''.  
In order to provide an answer to the question, I started by introducing some of the definitions of 
pornography, developed mainly by the radical feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catherine 
MacKinnon, to provide a better understanding of what pornography is, and to introduce some of the 
conflicts that pornography may pose for gender equality. After that, I reviewed some of the 
literature concerning the censorship of pornography, by presenting the feminist argument of the 
silencing of women, and also by reviewing Ronald Dworkin's objections to the censorship of 
pornography; I also addressed one of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon's attempts at 
regulating pornography through the Minneapolis ordinance; Then, I argued that a ban on 
pornography in the manners which the Ordinance planned would affect negatively women and 
minorities in the industry: in brief, it would create more conditions for their exploitation; it would 
ignore the importance of other media in perpetrating misogyny; it would also threaten women's 
autonomy over their bodies by denying them access to participate and consume pornography, and it 
would also remove the possibility of using pornography to educate its audience in a better way than 
mainstream pornography does; Finally, I briefly advanced two alternatives to the censorship of 
pornography in order to protect women's and minorities from the harms of pornography.  
Considering what was provided in preceding chapters, I believe that censoring pornography would 
not fit one of its main purposes: to protect women and minorities from the dangers of pornography, 
mainly, of protect their freedom of speech. Thus, in answering the research question, I believe the 
censorship of pornography is not good for gender equality, because it cannot eliminate many of the 
misogyny from where it stems from. Banning pornography cannot change the narratives of 
50  
pornography; it can only formally suppress them, which does not guarantee that hateful messages 
about women do not reach the audience. 
I have advanced that not regulating pornography in the way the Ordinance aimed to, may provide 
many possibilities in the spectrum of sexual education and respect for women and minorities' 
bodies; perhaps these measures could alter the meaning of pornography. In promoting more speech, 
female pornographers have the possibility of contributing to their views on sexuality, and have the 
power to counterbalance misogynistic views which exploit women. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that this thesis did not argue that a permissive police towards 
pornography would contribute positively to gender equality; this thesis argued that censoring 
pornography would not protect women in the way the radical feminists intended. Additionally, this 
thesis did not argue that neither banning nor tolerating pornography could protect the free speech of 
women; this thesis aim was to defend that censoring pornography could bring to women many 
undesirable consequences considering their socioeconomic status and disadvantage towards men. 
Moreover, this thesis proposes that if, censoring pornography does not generate consensus 
concerning a right to pornography and the protection of women, further research should look more 
closely to other alternatives which could aggregate more proponents of such measures.  
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